October 2, 2002

 

Anthropological Thought 1950 through 1975

 

            The Classificatory-Historical Period introduced new approaches incorporating chronological concerns with scientific methods such as seriation, stratigraphic analysis and typologies. This led to increasing endeavors by people like Gladwin, McKern, Kidder, and others to define culture chronologies using material culture. The Pecos Classification, Gladwin Scheme, and the Midwest Taxonomic Method are evidence of this. While the Pecos Classification directly deals with the dimension of time, others like the Midwest Taxonomic Method utilize time only indirectly, in the notion that change occurs over time.  A shared underlying assumption of these approaches is that similarities in objects imply similarities in cultures. When the dimension of time is also considered, these similarities create a sequence that can be laid out regionally as well as chronologically.

            As new discoveries such as Figgin’s Folsom point associated with extinct bison remains came into the archaeological arena, new ideas of time had to be considered. The relationship between time and space was becoming more tangible as scientific methodologies increased in accuracy and technicality. Excavation methods, more refined stratigraphies and greater attention to the recording of data led to a more holistic view of the past.

As the discipline of archaeology continued to evolve through the 20th century, the previous conceptions of time and how that translated into archaeological interpretations became more of a concern. The concept of the “other” along with the relationship between time and progress was brought into question. In the earlier part of the century, culture chronologies and the persisting concept of change as progress created a gap between “us” and “others”. Time was used not only as a measure of progress but also as a distancing factor between indigenous and Euro American populations. This view, long held in the discipline, rested on past misconceptions and biases which have no place in what in practice and theory today aims to be an objective science. In his book Time and the Other, Fabian cites an excellent quote by Degerando, which clearly expresses this attitude:

“The philosophical traveler, sailing to the ends of the earth, is in fact traveling in time; he is exploring the past; every step he makes is the passage of an age.” (Fabian, 7)

 

            Thus, the notion that time itself is imposed within cultures carried on. Throughout anthropology’s history, at first cradled in colonialism, then swept away in new scientific methodologies, time and space have been ever evolving factors to consider.

            Time was seen as a non-issue in early evolutionary thought. All cultures would pass through the same changes on their own timetable, unless helped along by more advanced civilizations. Then, time was seen as less important than culture contact in migration/diffusion theories. In the early 20th century, time was used to nail down concrete culture chronologies and explain similarities in material culture in terms of progress, which implied the passage of time. In writings like those of Fabian and Lenclud, we see a new consideration of time. Both authors caution against new biases justified by the concept of time. Lenclud offers a word on historiocentrism:

 

            “Our history is history, written in the etic form. The history of others is ethnohistory, a product of the mind created in the emic mode. This is yielding to the variant of ethnocentrism called historiocentrism.” (Lenclud, 45)

 

The defining of an “us” as an opposition to a “them” creates dichotomist views. Lenclud also addresses this in his comments on the Western values assigned to oral histories and traditions when compared against our Western written histories. The aspect of time and how it impacts the recollection of the past is different in these two institutions of culture, but can we assign higher value to one over another? The answer is clearly no.